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Abstract
Monitoring and reporting incorrect acts are pervasive for maintaining human
cooperation, but in theory it is unclear how they influence each other. To
explore their possible interactions we consider spatially structured popula-
tion where individuals face the collective-risk social dilemma. In our minimal
model cooperator players report defection according to the loss of their inter-
ests. In parallel we assume a monitoring institution that monitors all group
member and identifies wrong behavior with a certain probability. In response
to these feedbacks a sanctioning institution develops punishment schemes by
imposing fines on related defector players stochastically. By means of Monte
Carlo simulations, we find that the introduction of monitoring and reporting
mechanisms can greatly promote the evolution of cooperation and there ex-
ists a sudden change of the cooperation level by varying model parameters,
which can lead to an outbreak of cooperation for solving the collective-risk
social dilemma.
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1. Introduction
Ensuring sufficiently high level of cooperation and maintaining sustain-
able use of common resources are essential tasks for human societies [1, 2, 3].
However, selfish behavior often threatens public cooperation since it can
provide a higher individual income [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Bowing to
such temptation of short-term interests leads to an excessive use of com-
mon resources and ultimately “the tragedy of the commons” state seems to
be unavoidable [13]. Correspondingly, different ecological crisis [14] is iden-
tified, including the emergence of ozone hole [15], environmental pollution
[16], soil erosion [17], and climate warming [18, 19]. Stripped of particulari-
ties, these problems are identified as a sort of collective-risk social dilemma
[20], in which the declared collective target is in jeopardy, which has serious
long-term consequences [21, 22, 23].
Theoretical and experimental studies have proposed effective means to
promote public cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game [24],
such as reward [25, 26, 27, 28], punishment [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36], and
exclusion [37, 38, 39, 40]. In parallel, some other control mechanisms are also
identified in everyday life. For example, the monitoring-based and reporting-
based governance has been used for the forest commons management [41, 42],
which is found to hinder the free-riding problem. In general, the top-down
governance of monitoring and reporting means that once the feedbacks of
monitoring and reporting are received, the administrative bureau will punish
the defector based on available information. Such governance schemes are
particularly common for public resources in human society. More precisely,
a monitoring department monitors wrongdoers by random checks and pro-
vides information to a superior authority, while customers also report their
offenders according to their own degree of damage. As a result, the admin-
istrative department imposes fines on the related enterprises based on the
mentioned feedback information. This management system is pervasive in
our controlled society and serves as a key control mechanism to maintain the
quality of products high.
Motivated by these practical examples, in this work we propose a game-
theoretical model which considers the simultaneous presence of monitoring
and reporting mechanisms to explore their collective impact on public coop-
eration. We assume that when a selfish behavior is observed, the involved
cooperative players report defection to the external sanction institution based
on the extent of loss of their income. In parallel, a top-down organized institu-
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tion monitors players and reveals defectors from time to time. In combination
with the feedback information from the monitoring institution and individ-
ual reporting behaviors, a sanction institution may enforce the corresponding
punishment and accordingly imposes a fine on the related defectors.
We integrate these assumptions about monitoring and reporting into a
previously studied model of collective-risk social dilemma [43], in which coop-
erative players contribute a part of its endowment to refill the collective tar-
get, while defective players retain all the endowment for themselves. Without
external control mechanisms, it is found that in the collective-risk dilemma
model excessive abundant common resource deters cooperative behavior and
inefficient allocation of resources leads to the collapse of cooperation [43]. In-
terestingly, we find that when monitoring and reporting are considered, the
evolution of cooperation can be greatly promoted even if the allocation en-
dowment for individuals is small. We further find that there exists a sudden
change of the cooperation level when varying the model parameters, which
can lead to an outbreak of cooperation for solving the collective-risk social
dilemma.
2. Model
We consider a population of individuals who play a public goods game
on a L × L square lattice with periodic boundary conditions [44, 45]. Each
individual x forms a five-member group with nearest neighbors, hence every
player takes part in five overlapping groups and the group size G is five.
Initially a player is designated as a cooperator or a defector with equal prob-
ability. At time step t, the endowment aix(t) for player x in the group i is
defined as [43]
aix(t) =
{
b, if Ri(t) ≥ Gb
Ri(t)/G, if Ri(t) < Gb
. (1)
Here Ri(t) is the amount of common resource available to the related group i
and b represents the maximal possible endowment assigned to a player. Due
to the overlapping groups the total income of the player on site x can be
obtained from five sources, given as Tx(t) =
∑i=5
i=1 a
i
x(t). Meanwhile coopera-
tors contribute a fixed amount c to the common pool in order to prevent the
depletion, while defectors contribute nothing.
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Subsequently, cooperators may take individual reporting action based on
the comparison between the total income from the common pools and the
total cost they paid. Specifically, at time step t player x will report the free-
riding behavior around itself to a top-down organized sanctioning institution
when Tx(t) < Gc. In other words, the reporting probability ρx(t) = 1 in this
case. Otherwise, a cooperator reports the free-riding behavior around itself
with a probability depending on the income difference given as
ρx(t) = 1/{1 + exp[(Tx(t)− Tx(t− 1))/Kr]}, (2)
where Kr characterizes the uncertainty of reporting action and Tx(t − 1) is
the total income of player x at time step t− 1. Without losing generality we
use Kr = 0.5 implying that a cooperator prefers reporting bad behavior when
the income is decreased, but there is still a minor chance to report when the
income is increased. Notably, when cooperator x undertakes the reporting
action in the group, it should pay a reporting cost ε. Accordingly, the payoff
of cooperator x from group i is thus I ix(t) = a
i
x(t) − c − ε. Otherwise,
its payoff from group i is I ix(t) = a
i
x(t) − c. Besides, we assume that the
reporting probability of defectors is zero. And we assume that the total
income of cooperators is zero before the first time step since there are no
game interactions. On the other hand, the top-down monitoring mechanism
is used for inspecting individual behavior. For simplicity, we assume that the
group’s behaviors are monitored with a fixed probability ρM (0 ≤ ρM ≤ 1)
[46]. Thus defection behavior is detected with the probability ρM .
As we already stressed, the punishment schemes of a top-down organized
sanctioning institution are based on the information collected from moni-
toring and reporting actions. More specifically, defectors (if present) in the
group i will be punished with a probability which is a weighted mean of the
monitoring probability and the average reporting probability of cooperators
given as
P i(t) = (1− ω)ρiR(t) + ωρM , (3)
where ρiR(t) =
∑
x∈i ρx(t)/N
i
C is the average reporting probability of the
cooperators in the group i, N iC is the number of cooperators in the group,
and ω is a parameter characterizing the relative weight between the reporting
probability and the monitoring probability (0 ≤ ω ≤ 1). When defector x
is punished by the sanctioning institution, its payoff is reduced by a fine
λ, hence I ix(t) = a
i
x(t) − λ, otherwise its payoff collected from group i is
I ix(t) = a
i
x(t).
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Because of the overlapping groups, the total payoff Ix(t) of player x is sim-
ply the sum over all related I ix(t) payoff values from the overlapping groups.
Notably, in our model the monitoring cost and the punishment cost are not
considered explicitly for individuals in the game since they are covered by
the top-down organized external institution.
Starting with Ri(0) = R0 in all groups, after individuals playing the
games the updating protocol of the amount of common resources in each
group is defined as
Ri(t) = Ri(t− 1) +
∑
x∈i
[αsxc− aix(t)], (4)
where Ri(t) is the amount of common resource (public goods) available to
the group i at time step t and α is the synergy factor to the amount of
contribution [43]. For simplicity, we set c = 1 in this study.
After playing the games in all related groups player x adopts the strategy
of a randomly chosen neighbor y with the probability
q =
1
1 + exp{[Ix(t)− Iy(t)]/Ks} , (5)
where Ks denotes the amplitude of noise for strategy updating [47]. Without
losing generality we set Ks = 0.5. This value ensures that it is very likely
that a better performing player will pass its strategy to their neighbors, yet
it is also possible that a player will occasionally learn from a less successful
neighbor.
In our simulations, the key quantity for characterizing the cooperative
behavior of the system is the density of cooperators, which is defined as the
fraction of cooperators in the whole population. In our study synchronous
updating protocol is applied. After a suitable transient time, the system
evolves into a dynamical equilibrium state and the cooperator density reaches
its asymptotic value where the fluctuations remain as small as 0.003. All the
simulations were carried out on a square lattice with the size between L = 100
and L = 2000, where initially the two strategies of cooperators and defectors
are randomly distributed among the population with an equal probability
0.5.
3. Results
For the sake of comparison, we first briefly summarize the evolutionary
outcomes when the monitoring and reporting mechanisms are not consid-
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Figure 1: Panel (a) shows the stationary fraction of cooperators fc in dependence on the
maximal possible endowment b and the synergy factor α in the original collective-risk social
dilemma model. Panel (b) further depicts the fraction of cooperators fc as the function
of time for five different values of α at b = 5 in the case without the reporting-based and
monitoring-based governance scheme. Other parameters are R0 = 25 and L = 100.
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Figure 2: Panels (a) and (b) depict the fraction of cooperators fc in dependence on
monitoring probability ρM and weight strength of monitoring ω for α = 3 and α = 15
respectively. Other parameters are b = 5, λ = 1.6, ε = 0.5, and R0 = 25.
6
ered in the proposed collective-risk social dilemma game [43]. In Fig 1(a) we
present the stationary fraction of cooperators fc in dependence on the max-
imal possible endowment b and the synergy factor α. We observe that the
larger the values of the max endowment b, the broader the intermediate in-
terval of the synergy factor α where high level of cooperation can be reached.
This suggests that the common resources should be allocated rather than re-
stricted and cooperation cannot be effectively maintained for a small or large
value of α [43]. To further illustrate this finding we show how the cooperation
level evolves at low b values as shown in Fig. 1(b). It demonstrates clearly
that only adverse condition of α = 5 can ensure a limited level of cooperation
fc ≈ 0.29. But large or small values of α will always cause the collapse of co-
operation. These results indicate that in this collectiver-risk social dilemma
model a harsh condition is created for the evolution of cooperation when the
synergy factor is too small or too large for small endowment b values. We
are then interested in investigating whether the introduction of monitoring
and reporting mechanisms can promote the evolution of cooperation in such
harsh conditions.
As an answer, in Fig. 2 we thus respectively show the fraction of cooper-
ators for a small synergy factor value and for a large synergy factor value in
the case where both monitoring and reporting mechanisms are considered.
Specifically, Fig. 2 depicts the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
monitoring probability ρM and the weight strength of monitoring to punish-
ment ω. We find that a nonzero cooperation level can be ensured no matter
whether the synergy factor α is small [panel (a)] or large [panel (b)]. In ad-
dition, the region for full cooperation level for α = 3 is much larger than that
for α = 15. These results indicate that the introduction of monitoring-based
and reporting-based governance scheme provides a significant improvement
for the evolution of cooperation and the governance scheme can work better
for the evolution of cooperation at a small synergy factor value than at a
large synergy factor value.
We further unveil the effects of monitoring probability and weight strength
of monitoring on the evolution of cooperation in Fig. 2. On one hand, we can
see that for large values of ω, the cooperation level increases monotonically
by increasing the value of ρM . However, for the extremely low values of ω
(ω ≤ 0.05), the fraction of cooperators is almost unchanged as increasing
the value of ρM . On the other hand, we can observe that when the moni-
toring probability ρM is small, the fraction of cooperators decreases as the
value of ω increases both for α = 3 and α = 15. However, for large values
7
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Figure 3: Top row depicts the time evolution of cooperation for small α = 3. Panels (a)
and (b) depict the fraction of cooperators as a function of time for different values of ρM at
fixed ω = 0.25 and ω = 1 respectively. Panels (c) and (d) depict the fraction of cooperators
as a function of time for different value of ω at fixed ρM = 0.15 and ρM = 0.35 respectively.
Bottom row depicts the time evolution of cooperation for large α = 15. Panels (e) and (f)
depict the fraction of cooperators as a function of time for different values of ρM at fixed
ω = 0.7 and ω = 1 respectively. Panels (g) and (h) depict the fraction of cooperators as
a function of time for different values of ω at fixed ρM = 0.8 and ρM = 1 respectively.
Other parameters are b = 5, λ = 1.6, ε = 0.5, and R0 = 25.
Time
Figure 4: Top row denotes the time evolution of spatial patterns for α = 3. Bottom row
denotes the time evolution of spatial patterns for α = 15. Other parameters are ρM = 0,
ω = 0, b = 5, λ = 1.6, ε = 0.5, and R0 = 25.
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of ρM , the results are different. Specifically, for α = 3 cooperators become
completely dominant when ρM ≥ 0.48. While for α = 15 the fraction of co-
operators increases monotonically with the increase of ω. In particular, the
fraction of cooperators completely reaches its maximum fc = 1 only when
ω and ρM are both relatively large. Notably, we find that there exists an
outbreak of cooperation when varying the monitoring probability value and
the weight strength of monitoring, which implies discontinuous change of the
cooperation level when varying these parameters.
Furthermore, in order to illustrate how the cooperation level changes
specifically with varying the monitoring probability or the weight strength of
monitoring, we show the time evolution of the cooperation level for different
values of ρM and ω in Fig. 3. For α = 3 (top row of Fig. 3), we can see that
the fraction of cooperators fc at the stationary state increases suddenly from
zero to one as ρM increases very slowly (ω decreases very slowly) for the small
value ω = 0.25 (ρM = 0.15), as illustrated in Fig. 3(a)[Fig. 3(c)]. However,
for the large value ω = 1 (ρM = 0.35), the fraction of cooperators at the
stationary state increases gradually by increasing ρM very slowly (decreasing
ω very slowly), as illustrated in Fig. 3(b) [Fig. 3(d)]. While for α = 15
(bottom row of Fig. 3), we find that there also exist discontinuous changes
where full cooperation state can be reached suddenly for specific values of
ω and ρM . Taken together, our results show that adjusting properly the
monitoring intensity and the weight strength of monitoring can lead to an
outbreak of cooperation, where the evolutionary advantages of defectors over
cooperators can be completely subverted in the system.
To better understand our observations we present a series of snapshots
of strategy distributions for some representative values of model parameters.
For a deeper insight we use different colors not just for cooperator and de-
fector strategies, but also depending on the available amount of common
resources. In particular, blue (yellow) color represents cooperators (defec-
tors) centered in a group where Ri(t) ≥ Gb. Furthermore, green (red) color
denotes cooperator (defector) player centered in a group where Ri(t) < Gb.
Last, grey color marks defectors who are centered in a group where there are
no common resources left (note that if cooperators are present the common
resource is always larger than zero).
We first present two representative evolutionary outcomes for low and
high α values respectively. For α = 3 (top row of Fig. 4), cooperators can
be exploited easily by defectors in the initial rounds, and thus the fraction
of blue cooperators decrease rapidly. Only just a tiny portion of cooperators
9
Time
Figure 5: Top row shows the time evolution of spatial patterns for ρM = 0.739. Bottom
row shows the time evolution of spatial patterns for ρM = 0.74. Other parameters are
α = 15, ω = 1, b = 5, λ = 1.6, ε = 0.5, and R0 = 25.
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Figure 6: The cooperation level fC in dependence on punishment fine λ and reporting cost
ε for α = 3 [panel (a)] and α = 15 [panel (b)]. Other parameters are ρM = 0.5, ω = 0.5,
b = 5, and R0 = 25.
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survives who manage to form a critical size of compact clusters. Then co-
operators are more likely to destroy the defectors by raising their reporting
vigilance and forming reporting clusters. As a result, they produce a rela-
tively higher group benefit, which is marked by green color. Interestingly,
red defectors who enjoy the relatively high product of cooperative groups
can protect the group of grey defectors who have nothing. But sometimes
this protective shield becomes leaky which offers a chance for green cooper-
ators to propagate. Eventually, the cooperative clusters slowly expand and
gradually dominate the entire population. This observation supports the
general expectation that harsh environment could be useful for the commu-
nity to select cooperation strategy as the only evolutionary escape route [48].
While for α = 15 (bottom row of Fig. 4), the situation is very different.
The effectiveness of cooperators is so high that even a few cooperators in
the group are sufficient to provide enough common resources for each group
member. Thus, blue cooperators in the abundant common resources will get
the maximum endowment. Consequently, they relax their vigilance, do not
form a relatively larger clusters, and reduce their reporting intensity. This is
why yellow defectors who refuse to contribute to the group can easily prevail
against the blue domains of cooperators. Meanwhile, minor clusters of blue
cooperators have an evolutionary advantage over red and grey defectors. De-
fectors and a small number of cooperators can finally coexist. This highlights
that cooperators in the case of high α value are more likely to relax their
vigilance, resulting in a low level of cooperation.
We continue by illustrating the microscopic mechanism for a rapid switch
of cooperation level when monitoring feedback is at work. To do that, we
present series of representative snapshots for two different values of ρM in
Fig 5. For ρM = 0.739 (top row of Fig. 5), it can be clearly seen that
the sanction institution with higher monitoring probability can effectively
attack the fragmented defectors, and thus cooperators quickly propagate in
the entire population. Interestingly, some surviving defectors can form a
certain type of clusters. When cooperators meet the clusters of defectors, the
former needs to pay more reporting costs, which diminishes their evolutionary
advantage and provides a surviving chance for defectors. Meanwhile, with
the depletion of the common resources in the yellow domains, the scrappy
cooperators around the grey domains can survive by defeating grey defectors.
Thus such effect can lead to a stable coexistence of defector and cooperator
players. Interestingly, when we change the value of ρM just to 0.74 (bottom
row of Fig. 5), the evolutionary outcome is completely different. Here the
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scattered defectors are unable to resist the pressure of monitoring. They
who have formed clusters attempt to penetrate into the blue area, but they
cannot escape extinction. Fig. 5 further illustrates that there exists a critical
value of the monitoring intensity above which defectors cannot successfully
invade cooperators’ clusters and instead become extinct finally. When the
monitoring intensity is below the critical value, some defectors can coexist
with cooperator players. This thus explains clearly that there exists a sudden
change of the cooperation level as the monitoring probability increases. Here
we do not show the representative snapshots for different values of ω, but we
stress that similar spatial patterns to those in Fig. 5 can be observed when
varying the value of ω.
In what follows, it remains of interest to show how the fine λ and re-
porting cost ε influence the evolution of cooperation. Here, we present the
corresponding stationary fraction of cooperators for α = 3 and α = 15, as
illustrated respectively in Fig. 6 (a) and (b). As we can see from Fig. 6,
reducing reporting costs ε and raising fine value λ are conducive to produce
high levels of cooperation, even if the monitoring probability and decision
propensity are relatively modest. This indicates that related institutions
should try their best to reduce reporting costs and raise fines on defectors
for promotion of cooperation. In addition, there still exists a rapid change of
the cooperation level as the punishment fine or the reporting cost increases
for the two different α values. This warrants that the appropriate level pun-
ishment fine should be adjusted carefully in order to reach the desired goal
of high cooperation level [49].
4. Discussion
We have introduced a monitoring- and reporting-based governance scheme
into the collective-risk social dilemma game, and studied how their presence
influences the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations.
Motivated by the fact that these regulations are frequently applied in human
societies for the governance of the common goods [41, 42], we have inte-
grated such top-down organized control mechanisms with punishment into a
game-theoretical model. We emphasize that in our model when a defector is
selected to be punished, cooperators do not incur a direct cost to defectors,
whereas the top-down sanctioning institution imposes a fine on the defector.
Thus the second-order free-riding problem does not appear in present setup
and our principal aim is to investigate whether such top-down-type gover-
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nance scheme can solve the dilemma of public cooperation. By means of
Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the introduction of such governance
scheme can significantly promote the evolution of cooperation even if the sur-
vival condition for cooperators in the original collective-risk social dilemma
is extremely harsh.
More interestingly, we find that there exist sudden changes of the coopera-
tion level as the monitoring probability or the weight strength of monitoring
to punishment are increased. If the monitoring probability or the weight
strength of monitoring does not reach a critical threshold value required for
full cooperation, cooperation will remain at a very basic level. On the other
hand, only a tiny change is needed near the critical threshold, which will
lead to a huge increase of cooperation level. From the perspective of the reg-
ulation about fines and reporting costs, there also exists a sharp transition
from a low- to high-cooperative state. These observations suggest that the
key point to reach a highly cooperative solution is to properly adjust the key
parameters when the monitoring- and reporting-based governance schemes
are used.
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